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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This case of first impression seeks to remedy Google’s unfair and deceptive policies and
practices in targeting e-ventures instead of the content on the 366 e-ventures websites removed from
Google’s search results. According to Google, its 740+ page public-facing webmaster guidelines
(the “Guidelines”) nebulously suggest to webmasters (i.e., owners of websites) on how to get
websites on Google’s search results – and stay there.
The Guidelines provide even more obscure suggestions on how Google can designate a
website as “pure spam.” That designation effectively deletes the website from Google’s search
index (i.e., the Internet). If a Google user searches for the removed website on google.com, that
website will never again show up on Google (unless Google changes its mind – which Google
publicly acknowledges is “rare”). Rafferty Decl., Ex. 24 at 2. The “pure spam” designation is a
death sentence. That is what Google did to e-ventures. Google relies on hindsight to shift focus
from what it actually did (target e-ventures) to what it should have done (review content).
e-ventures is not a REDACT n of websites. It was a very real business. It made millions of
ED

dollars. And it employed numerous Florida residents. In and prior to 2014, e-ventures maintained
independent websites providing online publishing and advertising services. In its simplistic form, eventures provides rankings of companies in certain verticals similar to how Consumer Reports®
provides product ratings and reviews. e-ventures’ clients pay e-ventures to be reviewed and ranked
on e-ventures’ rating lists for certain verticals. That’s the same thing Google does to make money:
provide advertising space. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 22, RFA 1-2, 38. e-ventures’ clients paid a premium
to be ranked by e-ventures because e-ventures’ websites were highly ranked on Google’s organic
search results (i.e., a virtual billboard) – typically among the most valuable results (if not, the first
result). In short, e-ventures’ websites were found immediately beneath Google’s AdWords
advertisements – the precious listings by which Google generated nearly $60 billion in revenue in
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2014. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 22, RFA 41; Ex. 26 at #6.
To be clear, however, e-ventures was a real threat to Google. Because each dollar earned by
e-ventures was a dollar not earned by Google. This is because e-ventures specialized in ranking
companies in the search engine optimization (“SEO”) vertical. The companies in the SEO vertical
drive revenue away from Google because they facilitate a website’s higher placement on Google’s
organic search results. That results in more money driven away from Google’s bread and butter
AdWords program. For that reason, e-ventures competes with Google, which targets SEOs because
they threaten Google’s $60 billion money train. That is why Google fought so hard against
producing its secret “hit list” of SEO companies to e-ventures.
Google’s arguments fall flat. The First Amendment and the CDA do not apply to these facts.
Google engaged in anti-competitive behavior by maliciously targeting e-ventures (not content)
based on Google’s malicious belief e-ventures was an SEO. First, contrary to Google’s overtures,
Google did not remove e-ventures’ websites for content reasons or based on editorial judgments.
Put simply, to be an editor, you have to review content. And Google could not exercise “editorial
judgment” on content it did not read. Beyond that, the record establishes factual issues of whether
Google did, in fact, review the content on each of the 366 websites containing
during its less than

REDACTED

REDACTED

. Second, this Court already recognized that anti-

competitive motives are not protected by the First Amendment in its ruling denying Google’s
motion to dismiss. Likewise, bad faith is not protected by the CDA. Being prototypical questions of
fact, at a minimum, bad faith and motive must be decided by the jury. The undisputed facts
establish that Google (i) did not review the content on each of the REDACTED of e-ventures’
websites prior to removal, (ii)

REDACTED

and (ii) removed the websites, after
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REDACTED

.
Google’s anti-competitive motives are further evident from Google’s secret “investigatory”
documents. Notably, the

REDACTED

. Falls Tr. 113:21-24; 114:4-7;
Rafferty Decl., Ex. 9 (2042.R).

REDACTED

Falls Tr.
82:2-12; 115:5-8.

REDACTED

. Falls Tr. 120:11-19.
Returning to that external anonymous e-mail “tip,” Mr. Falls received that “tip” on
September 15, 2014, 09:48 [PST]. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 10; Google Tr. 79:13-17 (
).

REDACTED

REDACTED

. That tip contained a
copy of e-ventures’ customer list. Rafferty Decl., Ex 22., RFA 19, 50; see also Falls Declaration,
12/1/16, Ex. 15 (ECF 138-16). Yet, Mr. Falls never

REDACTED

Compare Rafferty Decl., Ex. 9 (GOOG_EVTS_00002013-2026) with Ex. 10.
To mask its anti-competitive motive and bad faith, Google relies on post-hoc justifications.
Not surprisingly, Google’s reconsideration request process (the process to get websites back on the
Internet after Google removes them) did not particularize the clear reasons for removal. e-ventures
Tr. 163:15; 164:18-20. That is because Google itself had no idea which of the REDACTED of e	
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ventures’ websites violated which guideline. As a result, e-ventures was forced to take remedial
measures in a desperate and scrambled effort to be re-indexed, so it could salvage what remained of
its business. e-ventures Tr. 164:23-25; 165:4-12; 169:4-6. The subsequent changes e-ventures made
to its websites were prompted by Google’s so-called suggestions, and are equivalent to coercedcompliant false confessions. Moreover, these so-called “admissions” are not admissible, let alone
negate that factual issues of Google’s targeting e-ventures and not content.1
Google intended to interfere with e-ventures’ business relationships.

REDACTED

Rafferty Decl., Ex. 11. If
REDACTED

Rafferty Decl., Ex. 12.
To add insult to injury, in conjunction with filing reconsideration requests, e-ventures paid
Google to advertise its banned websites through its AdWords Program in order to mitigate the
damage done to its customer base. e-ventures Tr. 156:14-18; Trika Decl. ¶8; Rafferty Decl., Ex 22.,

1

Furthermore, e-ventures’ filing reconsideration requests demonstrates the absence of “pure spam,” not guilt as Google
would have the Court believe. According to Matt Cutts, Google’s former head of webspam, "it’s rare for people to
actually file reconsideration requests for sites that are classified as pure spam, because many webmasters approach them
as churn and burn." Rafferty Decl., Ex. 24 at 2 (emphasis added). Google admittedly restored several of e-venture’s
websites despite Mr. Cutts’ caution that “pure spam is probably one of the more difficult spam flags to overcome.” Id. at
3. That Google revoked its “pure spam” penalties, so quickly after being removal, is evidence of anti-competitive
motive and bad faith conduct, namely that the removal was company-based and not content-based. That is because, as
Mr. Cutts says, usually pure spam websites are “churn and burn,” so Google became concerned about liability when eventures sought reconsideration. According to a Mr. Cutts declaration in another case, spam “refers to pages from the
World Wide Web.” Rafferty, Decl., Ex. 18, ¶ 2. He also provides a useful example: “a page containing pornographic
material that attempted to show up as a result to a search for ‘Disney Cartoons’ would be considered webspam.” Id.
There is no evidence that each page of e-ventures’ 366 websites contained pure spam, or that Google reviewed each
website page. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that Google removed those websites because of e-ventures, and not because
of any content on e-ventures’ websites.
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RFA 4-5. Curiously, e-ventures’ websites were not good enough for Google’s free search results,
but

.

REDACTED

In addition to the factual issues for the jury, Google is not entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law for four reasons. First, the CDA does not apply to Lanham Act or FDUPTA claims,
and its plain language provides immunity only for actions, not present here, “voluntarily taken in
good faith” for objectionable content. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) and (c)(2)(A). Second, Google’s
conduct is not entitled to First Amendment protection because Google was motivated by anticompetitive reasons: targeting e-ventures, not content on its websites, particularly after receiving eventures’ customer list. By removing e-ventures’ websites from its search results, Google falsely
represented to the world that e-ventures’ websites are pure spam. Third, Google’s deceptive and
misleading statements caused e-ventures substantial harm, and deceived e-ventures’ own consumers
into believing e-ventures went out of business, under FDUTPA. Fourth, Google tortiously interfered
e-ventures’ relationships by intentionally damaging them after getting e-ventures’ customer list.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
A.  

GOOGLE’S GUIDELINES
REDACTED

132:10-11; 133:1-6, 16-22; 146; 22-25; Rafferty Decl., Ex 22., RFA 13.
. Falls Tr. 29:13-14, 16-24; Rafferty Decl., Ex 22., RFA 20.

. e-ventures Tr.
REDACTED
REDACTED

. e-ventures Tr.
133:4-6. And, the Guidelines are not exhaustive. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 22 at RFA 15. While Google
has

REDACTED

see Google Tr. 94:23-24, the Guidelines state that websites (not

“networks”) are only removed if they contain “pure spam.” Rafferty Dec., Ex. 24. Google publicly
advises website owners that “pure spam is reserved for the spammiest of websites.” Id. Duplicate
content on your site does not mean penalization. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 25 at 2-3 (#duplicate-content).
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B.  

GOOGLE’S SPAM TEAM TARGETS E-VENTURES BECAUSE

Google targets SEOs.
Tr. 70:8; 153:4-6.

REDACTED

Google

REDACTED
REDACTED

Google Tr. 65:12-15; White Tr. 81:12-13.

REDACTED

Google Tr. 66:20-67:7.

REDACTED

Google
Tr. 68:3-6.

REDACTED

Falls Tr. 111:22-24; 113:1415; Rafferty Decl. 9 at 2042R-2054R (

REDACTED

).

The Guidelines suggest only that “sites” may be removed; nowhere do the Guidelines
disclose that a “network” could be removed for guilt-by-association reasons. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 22
at Ex. A. Yet, that is exactly what Mr. Falls did. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 22 at ¶9 (“we acted upon the
entire network of websites to efficiently use Google’s resources”). And, because e-ventures’
“network” of websites were removed without prior disclosure in the Guidelines, that leads more
credence to the fact that e-ventures was targeted – not the content on its websites.
C.  

GOOGLE SPENDS

REDACTED

Google cannot get its story straight. On the one hand, in its moving papers, Google says
each website was reviewed. But, just six months ago, Google admitted to reviewing only “numerous
individual websites.” Rafferty Dec., Ex. 23 at 17. Following that up, “Google intended its removal
actions not just to focus on particular sites but on e-ventures’ entire network [and] Google took
action against the network as a whole for several reasons” because Google wanted “to prevent eventures from migrating problematic content from removed to unremoved websites.” Id. (emphasis
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added). Rafferty Decl., Ex 22., RFA 27. That rationale strains credulity: if each website violated the
Guidelines, then Google should not have had to justify removing e-ventures’ network. Yet, in
another flip flop, two years before that, Mr. Falls declared under penalty of perjury that Google
acted upon e-ventures’ entire network of websites to “efficiently use Google’s resources.” Falls
Decl. ¶ 39 (emphasis added); Rafferty Dec., Ex. 22, RFA 25.
Further indicia of targeting e-ventures (instead of concentrating on content), Mr. Falls
REDACTED

.
Falls Tr. 63:9-12.

REDACTED

Google Tr. 70:8; 153:4-6. RE
Falls Tr. 24:11-12.

DA
CT
REDACTED
ED

Google
Tr. 45:8-16.
REDACTED

Falls Tr. 51:25. REDACTED
Falls Tr. 40:3-4.
.2 Falls Tr.

REDACTED

39:19; 72:25.

REDACTED
REDACTED

48:1-8. With good reason, he was caught. e-ventures’ 366 websites contain

. Falls Tr. 47:8-23;
REDACTED

). Rafferty Decl., Ex. 9 (1997.R – 2009.R). To review that number of websites
and pages in

2

REDACTED

, Mr. Falls would have had to

REDACTED
.
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REDACTED

. What makes that even more unbelievable is that

Google claims e-ventures’

REDACTED

Falls Tr. 31:2-12; 95:17-23; 101:2-10;
105:3-5; 131:5-16; 144:18-24; 146:18-23; 199:22-200:24; 217:20-24; 218:4-9. To confirm that, Mr.
Falls would have had to compare the content on one site with that of another, thereby doubling the
amount of work needed in that limited window of time –
See supra at 7, n.1; infra at 10-11 Mr. Falls testified that

REDACTED
REDACTED

Falls Tr.
105:3-5. That does not leave much time for Mr. Falls to confirm

REDACTED

There are 600 minutes in 10 hours.
REDACTED

Google Tr. 55:2-4.
Tr. 95:19-21.

Falls

REDACTED
REDACTED

Rafferty Decl., Ex. 9. Mr. Falls was on vacation
September 1 through September 5, 2014. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 15.

REDACTED

Falls. Tr. 89:7; 83:11; 56:4 (emphasis added).

REDACTED

Google Tr. 88:6-22.
The date of the external e-mail “tip” was September 15, 2014. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 10. On
September 15, 2014, in direct response to the “tip”, Mr. Falls e-mailed

REDACTED

Rafferty Decl.,
Ex. 11. On September 17, 2014, Mr. Falls subsequently
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Rafferty Decl., Ex. 10.

REDACTED

REDACTED

. Falls Tr.
105:25; 106:1; 108:23-25; 109:1-4; Rafferty Decl., Ex. 9.
REDACTED

. Google Tr. 140:14-21; 142:20-25; 143:3-6.

REDACTED

Google Tr. 141:613.

REDACTED

Falls Tr. 91:2-7.

REDACTED

Google Tr. 141:14-16, 22; Falls Tr. 91:15-17; White Tr. 61:24-25; 62:1-2. REDACTED

. Falls Decl. ¶39.
D.  

GOOGLE FAILS TO

REDACTED

Google admitted that

REDACTED

Google Tr. 110:18-21. Without question, Mr. Falls never REDACTED
Falls Tr.
93:18-20; 94:1-4,10-11. Had he done so, he would know about Google’s

REDACTED

REDACTED

Rafferty Decl., Ex. 19 (GOOG_EVTS00000977)
REDACTED
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White Tr. 112:5-11.

REDACTED

Google Tr. 38:13, 22; 42:13, 10-12, 19; 43:3. “

REDACTED

Google Tr. 31:6-8.

REDACTED

.
Google Tr. 200:3-4; 201:7-12.

REDACTED

Google Tr. 217:8-12.
REDACTED

Google Tr. 40:25;
41:1-2; 42:11-12.

REDACTED

White Tr. 90:1-4.

Google Tr. 95:10-19.

REDACTED

REDACTED

White Tr. 117:25;
118:1-3; Kwok Tr. 38:23-25; 39:1.

REDACTED

Google Tr. 95:5-7.

REDACTED

Google Tr. 93:25; 94:1-6.
REDACTED

. Google Tr. 101:2-4; White Tr. 90:1-4.

REDACTED

Trika Tr. 152:2-17. REDACTED

Google Tr. 145:24-25; 146:2-5;
Falls Tr. 86:2-3; White Tr. 87:22-23, 88:14-15,23; Rafferty Decl., Ex. 11.

	
  

10

REDACTED

Case 2:14-cv-00646-PAM-CM Document 146 Filed 12/15/16 Page 17 of 33 PageID 1831
	
  
. Falls Tr. 63:18-23; 64:17-22; 65:3-4.

REDACTED
REDACTED

. Falls Tr. 65:20-21; 73:12-20.

REDACTED

. Falls Tr. 73:12-16.
REDACTED

. White Tr. 48:7-8, 18-20.

REDACTED

Falls Tr. 33:14-21.
. Google Tr.

REDACTED

102:19-21.

REDACTED

, see Google Tr. 52:14-25,

REDACTED

see Google Tr. 55:5-15,

REDACTED

:
REDACTED

Google Tr. 101:17-21.
REDACTED

Google Tr. 134:22-135:1.
Instead of testifying as to facts supporting the removal, Google copped out: REDACTED
Google Tr. 134:22-135:1.

REDACTED

’
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REDACT .3
ED

follow the
E.  

White Tr. 95:4-7, 15; 117:11-24; Kwok 34:17-21. That is because Mr. Falls did not
REDACTED

. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 19, GOOG_EVTS00000977.4

E-VENTURES DOES WHATEVER GOOGLE TOLD IT TO REVOKE PURE SPAM

. White Tr.

REDACTED

98:14-17.

REDACTED

. White Tr. 101:4-7.

REDACTED

. White Tr.101:15-19, 20-23; Rafferty Decl., Ex. 9 (2042.R).

REDACTED

.
Rafferty Decl., Ex. 19.

REDACTED

. White Tr. 102:10-13.
Google did not provide any explanation as to why e-ventures’ websites were delisted. Trika
Decl. ¶¶16,18; Rafferty Decl., Ex 22., RFA 32.

REDACTED

Tr. 163:15; 164:18-20.

178:8-13.

3

REDACTED

REDACTED
oogle Tr. 209:7-11; 210:7-15; 212:20-23.
Google Tr. 206:22-24; 207:1; 212:3-7.
oogle Tr. 206:22-24; 207:1.

4

REDACTED
-ventures Tr. 151:17-25; 152:1-2, 14-16.
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REDACTED

Tr. 164:23-25; 165:4-12; 169:4-6.
REDACTED

. Trika Tr. 163:3-7,12-14.

REDACTED

.” Trika Tr. 146:810; 147:12-14.

REDACTED

Id.; e-ventures Tr. 169:14-15; Trika Decl. ¶5.
e-ventures’ disclosed expert in this case, Jeremey Paton, testified that

REDACTED

Rafferty Dec., Ex. 7 at 7 § 4; Paton Tr. 260:5-6. Google missed the
deadline to disclose an expert to discredit Mr. Paton’s opinion. Rafferty Decl. ¶28.
F.  

CAUSATION AND DAMAGES

Prior to removal, Mr. Falls was keenly aware of e-ventures’ contractual relationships that
depended on the websites’ positions on Google’s search engine:

Rafferty Decl., Ex. 11.

REDACTED

REDACTED

. Google Tr.
144:18-19, 25; Rafferty Decl., Ex. 11.

REDACTED

5

. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 11.

Moreover, during the ban, e-ventures launched a “test website,” (www.bwdanews.com), which simply included the
text: “ByeBye World.” Trika Decl. ¶9. Incredibly, according to Google, those two words constitute “pure spam”; so it
removed that site within hours. Trika Decl. ¶9.
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REDACTED

. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 17. Revenue plummeted and visitor traffic significantly
dropped. Trika Decl. ¶¶16, 25.

REDACTED

e-ventures Tr. 24:17-21.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Courts should act with caution in granting summary judgments. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Because summary judgment is a “drastic device,” cutting off
a party’s right to present its case to a jury, the moving party bears a “heavy burden” of
demonstrating the absence of any triable issue of material fact. See Nationwide Life Ins. v. Bankers
Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2nd Cir. 1999).
I.  

GOOGLE IS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY UNDER THE CDA
The legislative history confirms that the CDA was to protect children from sexually explicit

content. In his statement introducing the proposed legislation, Senator Exon proclaimed, “[T]he
information superhighway should not become a red light district. This legislation will keep that
from happening and extent the standards of decency which have protected telephone users to new
telecommunications devices.” 141 Cong. Rec. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Exon). The statute also explains that its passage was prompted by a desire to encourage the
development of “filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to
objectionable or inappropriate online material.” 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(4).
A.  

CDA DOES NOT APPLY TO LANHAM ACT OR FDUPTA CLAIMS

The CDA does not apply to claims brought under the Lanham Act or FDUPTA. Section
230(e)(2) states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law
pertaining to intellectual property.” 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(2). Section §230(e)(3) of the CDA does not
bar e-ventures’ FDUPTA claim: “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State
from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(2). Federal
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courts routinely enforce those provisions. Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Bleeping Computer
LLC, 2016 WL 3773394 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); see also Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com,
Inc., No. 00 Civ 71544, 2001 WL 1176319, at *1 (E.D.Mich. Sept. 25, 2001); Almedia v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006).
B.  

SECTION 230(C)(1) OF THE CDA DOES NOT APPLY

Section 230(c)(1) does not “create a lawless no-man’s-land on the internet. Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.
2008). Rather, it protects from liability only (a) a provider or user of an interactive computer service
(b) that the plaintiff seeks to treat as a publisher or speaker (c) of information provided by another
information content provider. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009);
Section 230(c)(1) (Stating only that: “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”),
In assessing a Section 230(c)(1) defense, “what matters is…whether the cause of action
inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the publisher or speaker of content
provided by another.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101–02 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added). “[C]ourts must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives
from the defendant's status or conduct as a publisher or speaker.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court in Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., 2016 WL 3660526, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2016) provides
an instructive analogy:
If someone delivers newspapers containing false gossip, and the person who is the subject
of the gossip sues the delivery person for defamation, that lawsuit seeks to treat the
delivery person as a publisher. But if the delivery person throws an unwanted newspaper
noisily at a door early in the morning, and the homeowner sues the delivery person for
nuisance, that suit doesn’t seek to treat the delivery person as a publisher. The suit doesn’t
care whether the delivery person is throwing a newspaper or a rock, and the suit certainly
doesn’t care about the content of the newspaper. It does not involve the delivery person’s
“reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication
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third party content.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102. Nor is the lawsuit asking a court to impose
“liability arising from content.” Roommate.com, 521 F.3d at 1162. It merely seeks to stop
the nuisance.
Id. Here, e-ventures is not seeking to treat Google as the “publisher or speaker” of information
provided by e-ventures (or any third party). There is no third party content at issue in this case and
e-ventures is not arguing that Google’s liability is based on information provided by e-ventures on
e-ventures’ websites. Rather, e-ventures claims are based on Google’s anti-competitive conduct,
which was in contravention of Google’s own statements to the public. Defendants are not
permitted to avoid liability for their own deceptive statements or unlawful conduct under Section
230(c)(1), which is what Google seeks to do here.
Thus, the issue is not that an e-ventures’ website stated “Bye Bye World,” for example, the
issue is that Google told the public that it would not remove these types of websites, and then
Google did it anyway, for anti-competitive reasons. Google’s “investigation” of e-ventures websites
started and ended
customer list,

REDACTED
REDACTED

. The “tip” email, and Google’s receipt of e-ventures’
, are compelling facts exposing Google’s anti-competitive

motive in removing e-ventures’ websites just days later without further investigation. See Nunes,
2016 WL 3660526 at *1 (denying summary judgment under the CDA).
Wrongfully removing websites for the purpose of decreasing competition and increasing
advertising revenues does not fall within the traditional editorial functions of a publisher. This is
particularly true because there is no evidence supporting any notion that Google even reviewed the
content of every website prior to removal. As competitors, Google and e-ventures seek revenue
from the same individuals looking for prime advertising placement on the internet. Yet, the cases to
which Google cites merely describe the exercise of that function (i.e. the decision whether to
publish or remove content) without regard to the purpose a given publisher might make for such a
decision.
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The jury must assess Google’s credibility, and scrutinize the anti-competitive motives,
behind Google’s exercise of “editorial” functions as a façade to decrease competition under Section
230(c)(1) without reviewing content. It must further determine whether removing e-ventures’
“network” of sites for efficiency reasons – something not disclosed in the Guidelines – evidences
anti-competitive conduct and bad faith. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 21, ¶39 (“we acted upon the entire
network of websites to efficiently use Google’s resources”) (emphasis added). On that point, there
would be no reason for Mr. Falls to act “efficiently” against the “network” on September 18, 2014,
if he already determined that each website page had violated the Guidelines.
C.  

SECTION 230(C)(2) OF THE CDA DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE QUESTIONS OF FACT
EXISTS AS TO GOOGLE’S GOOD FAITH

Good faith is a question of fact incapable of resolution on summary judgment. Google
lacked good faith under the CDA since it did not review the content on each e-ventures website
prior to removal and removed those websites immediately after receiving e-ventures’ customer list.
More glaring is Mr. Falls’ blatant disregard of the

REDACTED

– which establishes

an ulterior, bad faith motive. Rafferty Decl., Ex. 20, GOOG_EVTS00000977.
Section 230(c)(2) provides a shield from liability only for “any action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider . . . considers to be
obscene . . . or otherwise objectionable.” Section 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Section 230 is
captioned “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material,” which
indicates that Congress was focused on potentially offensive materials, not simply materials
undesirable to a content provider or user. 47 U.S.C. Section 230(c) (emphasis added); Song fi, Inc.
v. Google, Inc., 108 F.Supp.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 2015); see Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659–
60 (7th Cir. 2003) (interpreting Section 230(c) in light of this caption); see also Fair Housing
Council, 521 F.3d at 116364 (citing Doe and a subsequent Seventh Circuit decision with approval);
see also Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 997 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (declining “to broadly
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interpret ‘otherwise objectionable’ material to include any or all information or content.”).
A question of fact exists as to whether e-ventures’ websites contained “objectionable”
content. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida has held that
“objectionable” content must, at a minimum, involve or be similar to pornography, graphic
violence, obscenity, or harassment. Nat’l Numismatic Cert., LLC v. eBay, Inc., 2008 WL 2704404,
at*25 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2008). Other federal courts have aligned with the eBay court. The Ninth
Circuit expressed concern that such an “unbounded” reading of “otherwise objectionable” would
enable content providers to “block content for anticompetitive purposes or merely at its malicious
whim, under the cover of considering such material ‘otherwise objectionable.’” See Zango, Inc. v.
Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fisher, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
The statutory immunity provided for under the CDA “does not apply without limitation.” Almeida,
456 F.3d at 1321-22 (citing 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(1)). A jury must decide what is already known – eventures’ websites did not contain any pornography, graphic violence, obscenity or harassment.
This Court should follow the Middle District of Florida’s decision in eBay, Inc. There, the
plaintiffs sued eBay for reputational harm allegedly inflicted when eBay removed their coin auction
times for violations of eBay’s Counterfeit Currency and Stamp Policy. Id., 2008 WL 2704404, at*6.
Like Google does here, eBay argued immunity based on its public-facing policy of removing
“objectionable” material under Section 230(c)(2). Id. The eBay court called, as the Court should
here, defendant’s immunity argument “unsound,” because the content removed by eBay did not “at
a minimum involve or be similar to pornography, graphic violence, obscenity, or harassment.” Id. at
*25. There is not even a shred of evidence of objectionable material on any e-ventures’ website.
Google would not know that, however, because it did not review content prior to removal.
Likewise, content analysis – something Google did not do – is a prerequisite to immunity
under the CDA. The Court in Sherman concluded, as this Court should here, that Section 230(c)(2),
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the “good Samaritan” immunity, is inapplicable where Yahoo! did not engage in any form of
content analysis of the subject text to identify material that was offensive or harmful prior to the
automatic sending of a notification message. Sherman, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. Furthermore, just
last year, the Ninth Circuit held that traffic to a website is not a valid basis for Google’s immunity
under the CDA. In Song fi, Google removed a music video entitled “Luv ya” due to an inflated view
count allegedly violating Google’s terms of service. Song fi, 108 F.Supp.3d at 880. Google argued
there, as it does here, that something other than content – increased traffic – is “otherwise
objectionable” within the meaning of Section 230(c)(2) of the CDA. Id. at 882. The Court
summarily rejected that argument, analyzing that neither the plain meaning of “otherwise
objectionable,” nor the context, purpose, or history of the CDA, allows Google to stretch the reach
of the CDA to bounds not contemplated by Congress. Id.
Google’s overreaching here is likewise outside the scope of the CDA. Citing to the United
States Supreme Court ruling in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001), the
Song fi court reasoned, as this Court should here, that when a statute provides a list of examples
followed by a catchall term (or “residual clause”) like “otherwise objectionable,” the preceding list
provides a clue as to what the intent of the statute. Song fi, 108 F.Supp.3d. at 883. The Song fi court
stated that given the list of terms preceding “otherwise objectionable,” – “obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, [and] harassing ...” – it is hard to imagine that the phrase includes, as
Google urges, the allegedly artificially inflated view count associated with “Luv ya.” Id. The Court
added that even if it can “see why artificially inflated view counts would be a problem for ...
YouTube and its users,” the terms preceding “otherwise objectionable” suggest Congress did not
intend to immunize YouTube from liability for removing materials from its website simply
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because those materials pose a “problem” for YouTube. Id. (emphasis added).6 In short,
YouTube’s removal and relocation of “Luv ya” was not the kind of self-regulatory editing and
screening that Congress intended to immunize under the CDA. Id. at 884.
Similarly, Google’s after-the-removal conduct disqualifies summary judgment under the
CDA. In Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards, 2011 WL 900096 at *3, *8-9 (D.N.J. Mar. 15,
2011), the court denied summary judgment under the CDA where competing evidence questioned
defendant’s good faith in allegedly blocking blocked e-mail for financial motive, namely to
encourage the plaintiff to upgrade his service plan. Id. There, the court found, as this Court should
here, that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant acted in bad faith and was not entitled to
immunity under the CDA when it failed to respond to the plaintiff’s repeated requests for an
explanation as to defendant’s conduct. Id., 2011 WL 900096 at *9. This Court should continue the
favorable reliance on Smith, see Dkt. 86, at 13, by finding Google’s inability to provide, despite eventures’ repeated requests after removal and in this case, the specific reason each website was
removed or any evidence that it reviewed each website before removal.
All in all, the CDA does not give Google blanket immunity. First, e-ventures’ legitimate
business content was not objectionable under the CDA. e-ventures’ websites did not contain
pornographic or obscene content. Google Tr. 217:8-12. Google accuses e-ventures of “tricking” the
search results but the Court has already held that artificially inflating a view count does not
constitute objectionable content within the meaning of Section 230(c)(2). Song fi, 108 F.Supp.3d at
882. Second, Mr. Fall’s evasive testimony, the investigatory gaps in the manual action tool log and
the timing of the removal, which coincided with an uncorroborated external “tip” and the receipt of

6

Courts around the country are in accord. See also Goddard v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 5245490, at *6 (N.D.Cal. Dec.
17, 2008) (the relevant portions of Google’s Content Policy “relat[ing] to business norms of fair play and transparency
are ... beyond the scope of § 230(c)(2)”); eBay, Inc., 2008 WL 2704404, at *25 (concluding, based in part on eiusdem
generis, that Congress did not intend “otherwise objectionable” to refer to auction of potentially counterfeited coins).
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e-ventures’ customer list, unearths Google’s bad faith. That is in addition to Mr. Falls’ going rogue
by failing to

REDACTED

.” Rafferty Decl., Ex. 19, GOOG_EVTS00000977. Lest, he
apparently forgot, as the
REDACTED

requires, to

REDACTED

” and

REDACTED

.” Id.

The evidence establishes that (i) e

REDACTED

White Tr. 112:5-11; (ii)

REDACTED

Google Tr. 31:6-8;
38:13, 22; 42:10-13; 42:19-43:3; 101:17-21; 134:22-135:1; and (iii)

REDACTED

Google Tr. 110:18-21.
Google’s explanations are not plausible and lack credibility. Mr. Falls testified that eventures’ alleged conduct

REDACTED

Falls. Tr. 89:7; 83:11; see also Falls Tr. 56:4 REDACT
ED

”).
REDACTED
REDACTED

. White Tr. 61:19-22 (

REDACTED

. Or, even better, an internal discussion about e-ventures’ REDA
CTED

Falls. Tr. 17:4-5. Yet, Mr. Falls did not recall

REDACTED

. Google Tr. 88:6-22.;
Falls Tr. 91:2-7, 15-17; Google Tr. 141:14-16, 22; White Tr. 61:24-25; 62:1-2. The Court cannot
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resolve Mr. Falls’ serious credibility issues on summary judgment. See Jenkins v. Anton, 2016 WL
7180248, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2016) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences [] are jury functions, not those of a judge”).
In addition to the lack of internal Google communication corroborating Mr. Falls’ selfserving testimony to save his job, he testified

REDACTED

. Yet, there is no corroborative
documentary evidence –

. Nor is it credible that

REDACTED

he could have compared the content on 366 websites or REDACTED in the unaccounted REDACT
ED

or found tens of thousands of scraped articles or hundreds of doorway domains
in that period. Even more so, it calls into question whether Google was aware of the content
scraping – at all – prior to removing e-ventures’ websites from Google’s search results. Even if
Google could rely (which it cannot) on the inadmissible evidence of e-ventures’ reconsideration
requests7 to establish alleged tens of thousands of scraped articles (
8

REDACTED

it does nothing to prove

Google’s good faith awareness and reliance on that information before removal. Thus, just as the
court in Sherman held the CDA did not apply where Yahoo! did not engage in any form of content
analysis, so too should this Court find that Google’s inability to present any evidence of content
review or offensive content prior to removal does not support a CDA defense.9
7

The court may properly refuse to consider any arguments or facts arising from e-ventures’ reconsideration requests to
Google, or any conduct or statement relating to getting e-ventures’ websites back on Google, as remedial measures
under Federal Rule of Evidence 407. See Hughes v. Stryker Corp., 423 Fed.Appx. 878, 880–81 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding
that the district court properly refused to consider a party's arguments related to a recall letter on a motion for summary
judgment because it was inadmissible evidence under Rule 407).
8

The court may not consider inadmissible hearsay on a motion for summary judgment. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight,
683 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 2012). As a result, Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 24 to the Falls Declaration
(ECF 138-1), and Exhibit 9 to the Willen Declaration (ECF 138-28), and any discussion thereon in Google’s brief,
should be stricken.
9

Google clings onto e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F.Supp.2d 605 (N.D. Ill 2008) to support its claim for
immunity. But that case is distinguishable from the instant set of facts. There, e360Insight found that “a mistaken choice
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II.  

GOOGLE IS NOT ENTITLED TO FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Google is not entitled to protection under the First Amendment. To further its arguments in

cases like these, Google commissioned a White Paper, which concludes that search engines'
immunity is virtually limitless – see Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, GOOGLE FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR SEARCH ENGINE SEARCH RESULTS, 24 Geo. Mason U. C.R.L.J. 89
(2013). Interestingly, even in the White Paper Google commissioned, the authors note that the First
Amendment only protects Google to the extent its decisions are motivated by content (absent here):
To be sure, it is constitutionally permissible to stop a newspaper from 'forcing
advertisers to boycott a competing' media outlet, when the newspaper refuses
advertisements from advertisers who deal with the competitor. Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152, 155 (1951). But the newspaper in Lorain
Journal Co. was not excluding advertisements because of their content, in the
exercise of some editorial judgment that its own editorial content was better than
the proposed advertisements. Rather, it was excluding advertisements solely
because the advertisers—whatever the content of their ads—were also advertising
on a competing radio station.
Volokh & Falk, id. at 22.
As in Lorain Journal Co., Google did not block e-ventures' websites and advertisements
because of their content. In fact, Google assures the public that it never removes websites for
political, religious, or similar content-based reasons. Google blacklisted e-ventures for punitive,
anticompetitive reasons, and removed e-ventures' websites and ads as part of that effort. Google did
not even review all of the websites before removing them. Google did not document the violations
pursuant to the Spam Documentation Policy, Google continued to run paid ads for some of the same
(allegedly harmful) content, and some content remained the same before and after the websites and
ads were delisted. In defining "pure spam" as – whatever Google wants to define "spam" as –
Google is attempting to write itself a blank check allowing Google to punitively damage any party

to block [the plaintiff’s emails], if made in good faith, cannot be the basis for liability.” Id. at 609. No mistake was
made, here.
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for whatever reason with impunity. But having taken action against e-ventures, not content, Google
cannot credibly argue that it was just looking out for "relevance" for the benefit of its users.
Google’s First Amendment argument is supported by inapposite case law and fails for the
same reasons as the CDA. The decision in Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F.Supp.3d 433 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) is inapplicable because it was based on the pleadings and, unlike in Baidu, here: (i) Google's
removals were not politically-motivated; (ii) Google's removals were not content-based, they were
company-based; (iii) Google's removals were not accomplished through algorithms, but rather by
Mr. Falls; and (iv) unlike Baidu.com, Google has monopoly power – when you search something on
the Internet, you “Google it”. Id. Similarly, Search King v. Google, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D.
Okla. May 27, 2003) is not relevant because it did not involve paid ads or a discussion of
commercial speech, and Search King only asserted one claim - intentional interference with
contractual relations. Id. Lastly, the court should not follow Langdon v. Google, 2007 WL 530156
(D.Del. Feb. 20, 2007) because that was a decision on a motion to dismiss. Id. Unlike Langdon, this
case does not concern Google's rejection of objectionable ad content. The content of e-ventures' ads
remained the same before and after the Google ban. e-ventures Tr. 169:14-15; Trika Decl. ¶5.
III.  

GOOGLE VIOLATED THE LANHAM ACT AND FDUPTA
Google’s false representations amount to unfair competition pursuant to The Lanham Act,

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) and violate FDUPTA. FDUPTA prohibits a deceptive act or unfair
practice, which may be found where there is a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to
mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.
Advanced Protection Tech., Inc., v. Square D. Co., 390 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1165 (M.D.Fla. 2005)
(Plaintiff’s misrepresenting defendant’s conduct of cloning and selling plaintiff’s product precluded
summary judgment); Suris v. Gilmore Liquidating, Inc., 651 So.2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
This Court should follow Mario Valente Collezioni Ltd v. AAK Limited, 280 F.Supp.2d 244,
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256 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). There, the Court found that the defendant violated Section 1125(a)(1)(A)
when it (i) attempted to sell the plaintiff’s product; (ii) represented that the plaintiff “had gone out
of business or lost the label”; and (iii) damaged plaintiff’s relationship with buyers. Id. at 255-256.
That is what happened here. Google knew e-ventures’ business depended on Google’s
search results. After removal,

. e-ventures Tr.

REDACTED

156:14-18. Further, Google lied to the public, telling them that e-ventures had violated the
Guidelines and, effectively, communicated that e-ventures had gone out of business. What shocks
the conscience is that e-ventures’ allegedly “spammy” websites were not good enough to be on
Google’s search results, but they good enough for AdWords. e-ventures Tr. 156:14-18; Google Tr.
174:3-5; 178:22-25; 179:1. And e-ventures’ customers noticed. One of e-them stated that it
“

REDACTED

.” Rafferty Decl., Ex. 17
(P000380).
IV.  

GOOGLE TORTIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH E-VENTURES’ BUSINESS
RELATIONSHIPS
“To determine whether interference is justified or privileged requires a commonsense

consideration of whether the conduct was ‘sanctioned by the rules of the game’ and what is “right
and just’ under the circumstances.” Bluesky Greenland Envtl. Solutions v. 21st Century Planet Fund,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170898, *27 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2013).

REDACTED

. Google Tr. 144:18-19, 25;
Rafferty Decl., Ex. 10; Falls Tr. 111:22-24; 113:14-15. Indeed, e-ventures’ continues to be
damaged, and its profits and contractual relationships have been affected adversely. Rafferty Decl.,
Exs. 13, 16-17; e-ventures Tr. 24:17-21; Trika Decl. ¶¶ 9, 25.
CONCLUSION
The Court should deny Google’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
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Counsel for Plaintiff
e-ventures Worldwide, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 15, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of the Court using the Court’s CM/ECF system.
By: /s/ Sinead Rafferty
Sinead Rafferty

	
  

